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Abstract 
A dynamic of global economic development means that many countries are experiencing 
uneven development and their citizens are increasingly split between those who can access 
high skill jobs and those that cannot. As a result some citizens are living in cosmopolitan 
areas of growth and others in backwater areas of decline. There is emerging out of these 
processes two versions of England. In cosmopolitan areas we find an England that is global in 
outlook, liberal and more plural in its sense of identity. In provincial backwaters we find an 
England that is inward looking, relatively illiberal, negative about the EU and immigration, 
nostalgic and more English in its identity. This bifurcation of England is already having 
political effects reflected in the outcome of 2015 General Election. It will further reconfigure 
politics over the next two decades, creating diverse political citizens and a complex array of 
challenges and dilemmas for governments, political parties, campaigners and political 
organisers. 
 
Keywords: globalisation, economic change, anti-politics, class dealignment, locality  
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There is in England a growing divide in the political outlook of citizens in different places. 
Where you live can shape how you experience the world and structure your political 
perspective. Some citizens are living in cosmopolitan areas of growth and others in provincial 
backwaters experiencing decline. This bifurcation of experience and circumstances is already 
impacting political outlooks and behaviour. With the decline of traditional class cleavages 
and associated political loyalties, place-based experiences provide a new dynamic that is 
pulling cosmopolitan and backwater locations further apart and increasingly framing the 
political choices of citizens.  
 
There are emerging out of these processes two versions of England. Geographical differences 
have not only become sharper but have developed a strong cultural dimension. In 
cosmopolitan areas we find an England that is global in outlook, relatively positive about the 
EU, pro-immigration, comfortable with more rights and respect for women, ethnic 
communities and gays and lesbians and generally future-oriented. In backwaters we observe 
instead an England that is inward looking, relatively negative about the EU and immigration, 
worried by the emergence of new rights for “minorities” and prone to embracing nostalgia.    
 
This bifurcation of England is already having political effects that will further reconfigure 
politics over the next two decades, creating diverse political citizens and a complex array of 
challenges and dilemmas for governments, political parties, campaigners and political 
organisers. Post-war differences between places were reflected in more solid class blocs and 
based to a large degree on material inequality. In this context political mobilisation was easier 
to achieve and a political offer of economic growth for all could be made to “let all boats 
rise”. But the cosmopolitan/backwater schism of the twenty-first century presents different 
and more problematic challenges for political elites. First, as we will show, it exists in the 
context of intense negativity towards mainstream politics, an outlook shared in both growing 
and declining areas. Second, cultural differences are less easily reconciled or subject to 
political compromise. Third, changes in the economics of different places are reinforcing and 
sustaining differences, making it hard to operate with one political platform in the two 
“Englands”.    
 
Our evidence of divergent political attitudes and practices from citizens is provided by the 
British Election Study (BES); supplemented on one question by material from a survey 
specifically commissioned by the authors. We compare attitudes cosmopolitan and backwater 
constituencies in 2015 and show some stark differences. Data from 1997 is used to explore 
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whether and how the differences between cosmopolitan and backwater locations have 
changed over time. We start with an account of how we constructed our research before 
presenting the key findings and then discuss differences (and some similarities) in the 
outlooks of the two types of area and how these have changed over time. We close by 
discussing the implications of our findings for political elites and emerging forms of political 
citizenship.   
 
Approaching the two Englands 
There is a pattern of change that can be seen in contemporary democracies between cities and 
regions that are booming and creating high skill, high paid jobs and those that are declining 
and increasingly dominated by low skill, low paid jobs. Jeremy Cliffe argues economic 
dynamism is located around cosmopolitan cities with London, Cambridge and dynamic cities 
such as Manchester at the core.
i
 However alongside these kinds of cosmopolitan areas are 
provincial backwaters – such as Clacton – that show few signs of economic dynamism.ii 
Global economic change is driving uneven development and dividing areas between those 
where residents can access high skill jobs and those where they cannot. 
 
The idea that political outlooks might differ as a result of diverse geographical experiences is 
relatively uncontroversial. Spatial clustering of political practices and perspectives could be 
expected for a number of reasons. The most important factors are probably contextual where 
through shared experiences and regular interactions people come to see the world through a 
similar lens. It might also be that people self-select into areas they believe share their outlook. 
The evidence on this point is difficult to assemble. Studies suggest that self-selection is not 
made so much on political grounds but rather that processes work through the socio-
economic standing, employment and parental status of individuals;
iii
 that is they self-select 
but on non-political grounds. In short, context and self-selection work together to produce 
location effects. The emerging patterns of these effects in English politics is the focus of 
attention here.  
 
In order to explore differences between the politics of cosmopolitan and backwater areas in 
England we started with the constituencies of Clacton and Cambridge as our benchmarks. 
These are, respectively, exemplars of backwater and cosmopolitan locations. We draw on 
survey data from waves of the 2014-15 British Election Study (BES) Internet Panel and the 
2015 BES face-to-face post-election survey. Each wave of the BES Internet Panel consists of 
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a sample size of around 30,000 respondents and the face-to-face survey consists of around 
3,000. We are able to identify respondents residing in two sets of fifty constituencies 
resembling the geodemographic profiles of Clacton and Cambridge (consisting of around 
5,000 respondents of the sample for the Internet Panel and 500 respondents for the face-to-
face survey). We first used the Mosaic geodemographic segmentation classifications to 
identify the proportion of the population resident in each of the Clacton and Cambridge 
constituencies classified under each Mosaic type. We then refined these profiles based on the 
theoretical trajectories of cosmopolitan and backwater destinations to develop general types, 
and calculated the top-50 scoring English constituencies across those Mosaic categories (see 
supplementary materials, Tables S1 and S2). This inductive approach means our backwaters 
tend to be drawn from aging coastal towns, with a history of light rather than heavy industry, 
sometimes characterised by the decaying vestiges of Victorian seaside resorts. As a result our 
sample constitutes a particular expression of economic decline, and does not tend to include 
declining towns in Northern England which are being shaped by the ongoing processes of 
deindustrialisation. The nature of politics in those areas of economic decline may differ from 
the two Englands we identify here. We use data from the 1997 BES post-election survey to 
compare whether and how the differences between cosmopolitan and backwater locations 
have narrowed or widened over time. 
 
Dimensions of difference: attitudes, identity and disaffection 
Differences in the demographics and social and economic circumstances of the populations of 
cosmopolitan and backwater areas would suggest that their residents might display 
substantial disparities in their social and political outlook.
iv
 The survey data from 2014-15, 
presented in the columns on the right-hand side of Table 1, confirms that expectation, with 
the population of backwater areas being significantly more negative about immigration and 
Europe – and being significantly more negative than the average voter too. Cosmopolitan 
citizens on average are more socially liberal and are more open to change, immigration and 
global demands.
v
 Citizens in backwater areas are more socially conservative, and also more 
likely to identify as English or at least as equally English and British (76% compared to 
51%).
vi
 Cosmopolitan and backwater areas look like two “Englands”; the former confident 
and outward-looking and the latter anxious and inward-looking. 
 
Comparing attitudes in these locations with equivalent measures from 1997, presented in the 
left-hand columns of Table 1, provides important and novel insights. Strikingly, the gap in 
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attitudes on immigration has increased (from +9 in an equivalent question in the 1997 BES to 
+14 and +16 for questions in the 2015 BES). The shift in opinion on Europe is such that there 
has been a reversal, where backwater areas had previously lagged behind on support for 
leaving the EU in 1997 (-9), in contrast to their strong euro-scepticism of today (+15). These 
findings point to a fundamental shift in the politics of these areas. 
 
Perceptions that equal opportunities for ethnic minorities and gays and lesbians have gone 
“too far” also differ significantly across the groups, though opposition to gender equality is 
similarly uncommon in both places. On equalities for minorities there has been a significant 
polarization of attitudes. In 1997, respondents in backwater settings were marginally less 
likely to agree that equal opportunities for ethnic minorities had gone too far (-2). By 2015, 
there was a large gap between the two populations in the other direction (+13). Interestingly, 
we see no equivalent shift in attitudes on gays and lesbians (where the gap has remained 
fairly stable between the two points and time), and a narrowing of differences on gender 
equality (though small in magnitude). Lastly, one of the characterisations of backwater “left 
behind” settings points to nostalgia about a bygone era. Whereas the 1997 BES saw greater 
support for customs and tradition in cosmopolitan settings (-10), a 2014 Populus survey 
found much higher support for “turning the clock back to the way Britain was 20-30 years 
ago” in backwater areas (+14). While not directly comparable, this does suggest a substantial 
shift in the nostalgic politics of these sorts of area.  
 
We also see a growing divide in terms of expressions of identity in these areas. In general 
there has been a shift towards Englishness as distinct from Britishness, with the percentage of 
respondents saying that they are English not British rising from 7% to 13%. The gap between 
cosmopolitan and backwater settings has risen slightly from +6 to +8, with cosmopolitans 
being significantly less likely to indicate Englishness as their single national identity. There 
has been a significant rise in the number of cosmopolitan residents saying they have no 
national identity (11% compared to 1% in 1997, coinciding with a fall in the proportion of 
‘other’ from 18% to 4%), which contrasts with the relative absence of this group in backwater 
settings (0%). The gap between those that describe themselves as “White British” between 
1997 and 2015 has increased substantially, reflecting the changing demographics of England. 
Across the country there has been a decline, but in backwater locations 96% of the population 
are White British compared with 70% in cosmopolitan areas, a 15% decline in the latter since 
1997. In summary, the growing polarization of attitudes between the two Englands has been 
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accompanied by nuanced yet important changes in expressions of identity. Backwater areas 
have become more ingrained in a White British and English identity and cosmopolitan areas 
have seen an expansion and greater pluralism in people’s expressed identity.   
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Table 1: Political attitudes and identity in cosmopolitan and backwater settings in England 
 1997 2014-15 
 Cosmo-
politan 
All 
Back-
water 
Cosmo-
politan 
All 
Back-
water 
Immigration/Europe       
Immigration bad for the economy
†
  -  - 29 42 45 
Immigration undermines cultural life
†
  -  - 38 48 52 
Black and Asian immigration bad for Britain  27 37 36 - - - 
Britain should withdraw from EC/Would vote to leave the EU# 31 31 22 35 44 50 
Dissatisfied with EU democracy - - - 76 79 82 
Social Change       
Equal opportunities for minorities gone too far^ 22 26 20 34 43 47 
Equal opportunities for women gone too far^ 12 9 8 13 14 13 
Equal opportunities for gays and lesbians gone too far^ 29 39 42 25 31 36 
Better to keep customs and tradition than to adapt/blend 29 20 19 - - - 
Would turn clock back to way Britain was 20-30 years ago* - - - 39 46 53 
Identity       
English not British+  3 7 9 7 13 15 
More English than British+ 13 17 17 8 10 9 
Equally English and British+ 34 45 45 36 48 52 
More British than English+ 13 14 16 13 10 10 
British+ 16 9 7 19 10 10 
None+ 1 1 1 11 3 0 
Other+ 18 5 6 4 4 3 
Ethnicity       
Race/ethnic group or background (self-rated): White British
^†#
 85 93 98 70 88 96 
Note: all data for 1997 from the British Election Study face-to-face post-election survey, 1997. 
^ British Election Study Internet Panel, Wave 1, 2014.  
†
 British Election Study Internet Panel, Wave 4, 2015.  
# British Election Study Internet Panel, Wave 6, 2015.  
+ British Election Study face-to-face post-election survey, 2015 
* Populus, Survey for Universities of Southampton and Canberra, 2014. 
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Dimensions of citizenship: political engagement anti-politics 
We were interested not only in attitudes in cosmopolitan and backwater locations but also in 
differences in modes of political engagement. These are shown in Table 2. Interestingly, there 
are fewer differences between backwater settings and the average English constituency, 
suggesting it is more cosmopolitan places which differ in terms of participation,
vii
 though 
turnout is higher in backwater locations. Overall, the pattern of participation beyond voting 
matches that long found in audits of political engagement,
viii
 where low cost activities such as 
signing a petition or boycotting a good/service figure strongly.  
 
Table 2: Modes of political participation 
 
Cosmo-
politan  
All  
Back-
water 
Turnout+ 73 73 78 
Actions undertaken  in last 12 months, offline#    
Contacted politician, government, local government official 19 18 18 
Signed petition (not on Internet) 9 9 9 
Done work on behalf of political party or action group 8 6 5 
Donated to a political party, organization or cause 12 8 8 
Taken part in a demonstration 4 2 2 
Boycotted/purchased products for political/ethical reasons 19 14 13 
Gone on strike or taken industrial action 3 2 1 
Actions undertaken  in last 12 months, online#    
Signed petition on Internet 41 38 36 
During last 4 weeks posted or shared any political content online
†
    
Shared political content on Facebook 15 13 11 
Shared political content on Twitter 21 18 16 
Shared political content on e-mail 4 2 2 
Shared political content via instant messaging 2 1 1 
During last seven days, time spent per day following news/politics/current affairs on the 
Internet (1 hour or more)#  
38 30 26 
†
 British Election Study Internet Panel, Wave 5, 2015.  
# British Election Study Internet Panel, Wave 6, 2015.  
+ British Election Study face-to-face post-election survey, 2015 
 
There are some differences in levels of engagement in political activity that takes place 
online. In cosmopolitan areas, 41% of respondents had signed a petition on the Internet 
within the past 12 months, compared to 36% for those from backwater areas. Similarly, 
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cosmopolitans were more likely to have shared political content on Facebook or Twitter (as 
measured in the pre-election survey wave), and spent more time per day following news, 
politics or current affairs on the Internet for an hour or more compared to their counterparts in 
backwater locales.
ix
 Our findings therefore suggest that the cosmopolitan-backwater schism 
extends to a degree to political engagement as well as social attitudes, and applies to both 
traditional and digital modes of political action.  
 
The final issue we tested attitudes on was on how our political system is judged. While it has 
been argued that backwater “left behind” localities exhibit distrust of mainstream politics and 
openness to various forms of populist challenge
x
, we do not see distinctive expressions of 
anti-political sentiment in cosmopolitan or backwater settings. Both sets of populations look 
remarkably similar to the average voter across England. This finding leaves the question of 
what might be driving the negativity of cosmopolitan residents. The answer is more likely to 
lie in the processes of politics rather than its failure to deliver. The evidence in Table 3 
suggests it is perceptions of politicians and the conduct of politics that is the problem.  
 
Table 3: Attitudes towards politics and politicians 
Agreement with statement: 
Cosmo-
politan  
All  
Back-
water 
It doesn’t matter which party is in power 14 15 15 
Distrust in MPs 44 48 47 
Politicians only care about people with money
†
 56 59 57 
Politicians don’t care what people like me think 53 56 55 
Dissatisfied with UK democracy 49 47 46 
Dissatisfied with English democracy 53 51 48 
 
^ British Election Study Internet Panel, Wave 1, 2014.  
†
 British Election Study Internet Panel, Wave 4, 2015.  
# British Election Study Internet Panel, Wave 6, 2015.  
+ British Election Study face-to-face post-election survey, 2015 
 
Exploring the results: implications for politics   
Where you live matters and our evidence indicates that two Englands are emerging: one 
cosmopolitan and one backwater. Because the BES offers us a nationally representative 
sample, we can show that, even after demographic and socio-economic factors are accounted 
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for, it appears that those living in backwater and cosmopolitan areas hold distinctive views 
and are on different political trajectories. In this section of the article we begin to explore the 
implications of this bifurcation of politics.   
 
Challenges for national elites 
The emergence of the two Englands brings into play a new political dynamic. In majoritarian 
systems such as the UK’s, the challenge for party elites is to build an electoral coalition that 
straddles the divides created by the bifurcation of politics. Table 4 suggests, on the basis of 
the results of the 2015 General Election, that the Conservative Party in England has proved 
better at this than Labour. The Conservatives appear to be both more adept and more 
pragmatic in their willingness to provide targeted and focused appeals to a wider variety of 
constituencies. They have a strong foothold in both cosmopolitan and backwater areas 
(receiving 34% of the vote in the former), and notably outperform Labour in attracting votes 
in backwater constituencies by a ratio of over 3:1. In contrast, Labour is ahead in 
cosmopolitan areas. The pattern of support for other parties matches expectations. UKIP is 
twice as strong in backwater settings. The Greens are stronger in cosmopolitan locations. The 
Liberal Democrats fared evenly (badly) between the two.  
 
Future electoral trajectories will to a degree be framed by how effective parties are at dealing 
with the cosmopolitan/backwater divide. The dilemmas facing political leaders will become 
considerably more acute. So, for example, right-of-centre parties such as the Conservatives 
will need to make sure they reach out to ethnic minorities and do not pander too much to the 
fears about immigration expressed in backwater areas, although they will still need to address 
some of the policy issues raised by the control of migrant numbers and by the impact of 
migration. The issue of Europe looms large for their prospects too, with the fallout from the 
EU referendum – whatever the result – being difficult to manage as the prevailing mood in 
cosmopolitan and backwater constituencies appears to be heading in opposite directions, 
leaving one group likely to be disappointed and looking for someone to blame. All parties 
will need to take on board the emerging economic strength and growth of cosmopolitan areas 
and pitch themselves in a way that recognises the liberal, progressive outlook of many 
citizens in those areas. 
 
On the left, Labour’s problem is that it is struggling in backwater areas and is by no means 
dominant in cosmopolitan areas. Moreover the public image of its leadership – reinforced by 
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the election of Jeremy Corbyn as leader – suggests a cosmopolitan bias in outlook and appeal. 
Too many voters see Labour as thinking global and neglecting more “mundane” English 
concerns. The party elite and its members (found to be disproportionately “high-status city 
dwellers”xi) share the values of cosmopolitan England and have less in common with the 
politics of backwater locations. Labour is consequently struggling to develop a policy 
platform that reflects the concerns of backwater areas, instead focusing on issues – such as 
Trident – that are out of step with public opinion in backwater locations. It is possible that an 
anti-austerity message could gain traction with voters in backwater areas but Labour’s 
cultural cosmopolitanism may make it difficult for that message to be heard. Equally it is 
possible that a compromise over immigration policy could be designed to appeal in both 
cosmopolitan and backwater areas but there may be a barrier created by the cosmopolitan 
outlook of the leadership – that equates expressions of concern about immigration with 
racism – that can block pragmatic policy positioning.   
 
Table 4: Vote share in the 2015 general election, English constituencies 
  
Reported vote
+
 
Cosmopolitan 
(%) 
All 
(%) 
Backwater 
(%) 
Conservative 34 44 55 
Labour 42 34 16 
Liberal Democrat 10 7 11 
UKIP 6 11 13 
Green 6 4 2 
+ British Election Study face-to-face post-election survey, 2015 
 
A further challenge is to govern in a way that does not lead to rapid decline in popular 
support because designing policies to suit both cosmopolitan and backwater areas is a 
difficult and precarious business. Policy measures might be targeted at individuals (for 
example increased public investment in education and training in backwater areas) or be 
place-based (for example giving priority to the environmental quality of life in areas left 
behind by the trajectory of urban development). Neither of these measures is easy to deliver. 
People-focused policies may be difficult to resource both in terms of the finances required 
and in terms of getting the human resources (the skilled or professional support staff) in the 
right locations. Place-oriented strategies that mean giving up on growth and accepting decline 
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are not easy policy options to sell. The challenges facing policy-makers in backwater 
locations are considerable. Simplistic policy options of attracting new industries or sectors 
can be little more than wishful thinking. Practical constraints such as a shrinking fiscal base, 
unused or empty properties and a lack of relevant skills in the population loom large.  
 
The Conservatives’ preferred solution would appear to be to push the challenges away from 
central government towards local government and new forms of regional governance. A 
range of “radical” devolution plansxii for England which involve generic new responsibilities 
and fiscal autonomy for local government, new devolved arrangements with the NHS and 
bespoke regional deals for particular locations is unfolding. But there are reasons for 
questioning some of these developments. One fear is that what is on offer is greater local 
responsibility without the effective power or resources to develop effective solutions. The 
Treasury appears to grant autonomy to control and raise local taxes but then builds in 
assumptions about efficiency savings and those tax funds into big cuts in centrally provided 
revenue support. Moreover it appears that the desire to have nationally-led policy initiatives 
on display has hardly disappeared in areas such as housing and education. The position is at 
best a rather muddled and at worst a faux devolution programme. On the other hand in this 
unpredictable new world what may also emerge is a more effective voice for declining areas 
– especially through the proposed election of city region mayors – making the management 
of politics more challenging for Westminster and Whitehall.  
 
For cosmopolitan areas the policy dilemmas are no less acute. Managing housing supply, 
ensuring transport links and maintaining the cultural and environmental attractions of the 
location can be demanding. There are also likely to be a variety of “hot button” issues in 
these areas around development and infrastructure plans that will be difficult to manage both 
in terms of central-local government and government-citizens relations. For instance, targets 
for house-building in cosmopolitan locations may be controversial. The row over expansion 
of Heathrow – and repeated political deferral of the final decision – is another example. 
Again for growth-oriented cosmopolitan areas the most likely governance prescription is a 
greater degree of devolved power to these areas so that civic leaders and citizen organisations 
can adapt with flexible strategies to their growth environments. But there are still likely to be 
dilemmas in terms of the degree of autonomy allowed and the redistribution of the wealth 
created in growing areas to those areas “left behind”. The issue of distribution of public 
investment is likely to become more severe. Those areas that generate growth need 
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investment but so do those left behind. The tensions over these issues are reflected in 
reactions to the latest local government financial settlement.   
 
Political elites may argue they can adapt and survive as they have in the past to new political 
demands. The policy agenda can be twisted to meet diverse demands, they might argue. But 
there are (at least) three reasons for doubting that the bifurcation of politics between 
backwater and cosmopolitan locations will involve only a modest shift in the behaviour and 
outlook of political elites. 
 
The first is that the divide between backwater and cosmopolitan areas is unlikely to be 
resolved by backwater areas catching up, given the sustained and powerful nature of the 
global forces that are driving change. There is a material base to the concerns of different 
types of citizens about the direction of politics that is likely to be sustained for a number of 
decades, and may even accelerate. Winners and losers are being created by the dynamics of 
emerging backwater and cosmopolitan areas and smarter, better politics by mainstream 
parties or other political actors cannot necessarily address that fundamental divide.  
 
A second factor, as already demonstrated in Table 3, is that neither declining nor growing 
areas appear to have citizens who particularly trust politics. Voters are therefore alert to 
political games and view politicians from all sides with disdain. They are especially on the 
lookout for authenticity in politics. You cannot be against immigration and then expect those 
who live in economies that thrive on it to rush to vote for you. Equally for a mainstream party 
to trim on issues such as immigration “is a losing strategy as the votes that are potentially 
won by shifting closer to the populist position are balanced by those lost from more moderate 
voters, alienated by a move from the centre”.xiii In addition anti-political sentiment makes 
mainstream parties more vulnerable to sustained populist challenge. The evidence we have 
thus far is that populists, whether sharing power or effectively excluded from office, retain 
their radical and distinctive policy positions. Although larger mainstream parties can steal 
some of their policy positions they cannot move too far for fear of alienating other voters.
xiv
 
Once a populist, always a populist; there is no point moving to the middle ground and if you 
do someone will take your place. Populism has a material base and although it may change its 
institutional expression it is unlikely to disappear as long as the material base remains. Some 
party or campaign group will always follow the political logic of attempting to represent 
themselves as flag-bearers for those concerns. 
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A third reason for stressing the sustained challenge of new cleavages is that the increasingly 
fragmented and volatile issue agenda of national politics is driven in part by dynamics that 
are accentuating the divide between cosmopolitan and backwater areas, leaving policy-
makers with an increasing number of issues on which there is no middle ground. For 
example, higher levels of education are associated with a more diverse and unstable public 
agenda,
xv
 while the rise of post-materialist issues like the environment and niche issues such 
as immigration have displaced the traditional dominance of the economy, defence and foreign 
affairs as the focus of public concern. Yet the capacity of government to deal with issues has 
not increased at the same pace, putting pressure on the political agenda leading to more rapid 
turnover and greater volatility. Moreover the cultural aspect to these divisions makes for a 
different set of political dilemmas compared to the past splits based more directly on material 
differences. The divide between cosmopolitan and backwater locations is such that political 
appeals based on growth and material gain for all are not only implausible (given the global 
economic logic) but also limited, as they do not deal the cultural divides which separate 
voters in the two locations. You cannot authentically be both liberal and non-liberal on social 
rights, both for and against immigration, or keen on England as part of new global 
cosmopolitan world and at the same time appeal to fearful little Englanders.    
 
 
New political citizens? 
Changing patterns of location could be a source of new political practices but the choices 
open to citizens are still contingent on their values and preferences. Neither backwater areas 
nor cosmopolitan areas will necessarily produce a single type of new political outlook and 
practice among its residents, even among those who are exemplars of the differences between 
the areas. The picture is likely to be complex but it is possible to characterise the emerging 
trends. In general it is easier to identify the political trajectory of those in backwater rather 
than cosmopolitan locations.  
 
It has been shown
xvi
 that in Britain there are emerging two types of negativity towards 
politics. The first is the “disaffected” democrat who has low trust in political elites but is keen 
to participate more, argues for a new type of politics and is interested in political engagement 
but on their own terms and using a non-traditional repertoire. For them the issue is the need 
for democratic transition. The second group – who can be labelled “stealth” populists – also 
displays considerable political negativity towards the Establishment and political elite but is 
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more traditional in its political repertoire and commitment to political institutions. The issue 
for this group is less the need for new democratic mechanisms and more for existing political 
institutions to be better led. The call from this group is to change the nature of modern elites 
that are seen as out-of-touch, too liberal and unable or unwilling to deal with its key issues of 
concern.  
 
Residents of backwater locations may well feel alienated by mainstream politics and political 
elites and are prone to a stealth populist outlook of politics that has at its heart a sense that the 
people have been left behind by a political class that is running the system for its own benefit 
not that of the average citizen.
xvii
 The emergence of left- and right-wing populism is a feature 
of the landscape in many contemporary democracies and our evidence would indicate that its 
strongest home is going to be in backwater locations that are fertile for the growth and spread 
of political disaffection. The most obvious expression is the emergence of UKIP as a political 
force providing a platform for right-wing populism.
xviii
 It is possible that changes in the focus 
and orientation of the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn would provide scope for left-wing 
populism, which has been absent largely in Britain but has surfaced in a number of southern 
European countries.
xix
  
 
Some cosmopolitan citizens might be put into the camp of emerging disaffected democrats 
but we would be keen to emphasise the heterogeneity of cosmopolitan citizens. Some may be 
looking for parties to provide a radical alternative to mainstream assumptions about society, 
economy and the environment. They may want back a left-leaning Labour Party or look to 
the Green Party instead. Others may mix social liberalism with a preference for mainstream 
economic management and find themselves backers of centre-oriented parties of right or left. 
Moreover we are uncertain about claims of a new type of politics emerging from these 
cosmopolitan areas. Some residents of cosmopolitan areas may become standard-bearers for 
“oppositionalist” politics using social media and short-lived political movements to express 
their concerns on a range of issues that matter to them. These political actors may be 
unwilling to tie themselves to any political party or, if they do, may treat the party as part of a 
movement rather than displaying great institutional loyalty (a feature of some of the new or 
returning members of the Labour Party under Corbyn).   
 
What our evidence suggests, at least in terms of the repertoire of participation, is that many 
citizens in both cosmopolitan and backwater locations will be relatively inactive when it 
comes to political actions beyond voting. That is not to say that they will be apathetic or non-
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participants. Following the work of Ekman and Amna it becomes possible to look beyond 
manifest participation and non-participation towards latent or “standby” participation where 
citizens are ready to engage even if not regularly doing so.
xx
 They practice a range of 
activities that might be called pre-political but could become political. They might express 
interest in politics and claim some knowledge of it. They may be active in their community in 
non-political organisations and will follow current affairs and talk about issues with family 
and friends or on social media. Will standby politics mixed with manifest participation be 
more prevalent still as the cycle of dipping in and out of politics becomes easier and more 
effective in the world of social media? The higher levels of engagement using online tools in 
cosmopolitan areas tend to reflect demographic differences (and use of technology) rather 
than a more substantial change of political style (at least as far as our analyses enable us to 
discern). It remains a difficult issue is to judge the impact of the repertoire of participation 
associated with cosmopolitan areas. 
 
Political elites are aware that politics is changing. The institutional solutions so far trialled by 
political elites are based on engaging with citizens in new and different ways but tokenistic 
power-sharing is likely to have limited impact. Political parties are offering multi-speed 
memberships stretching beyond the traditional full form to trial periods, through supporter or 
funder roles to various types of online engagement.
xxi
 Governments at local, regional, 
national and supranational levels are experimenting with democratic innovations and new 
forms of political participation.
xxii
 One issue is that most of these practices are tacked on to 
existing sets of political institutions, formulas and standard operating procedures that have 
not substantially changed. They provide window-dressing to a political practice that remains 
fundamentally the same. Another issue is that the media often appear happy to play the role 
of defender of the traditional in politics and are sceptical about any new practices, making the 
task for would-be reformers all the more challenging. The scale of the social, economic and 
cultural changes outlined in our analysis suggests that more fundamental shifts in political 
practice by mainstream actors will be required. 
 
Conclusion 
England is developing a bifurcated political world. Cosmopolitan citizens tend to be more 
socially liberal, open to change, and more positive about the impact of immigration and 
global demands. Citizens in backwater areas are more socially conservative and fear change, 
immigration and global dynamics. Weaker but still relevant differences in political repertoires 
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and styles also exist, with cosmopolitan citizens more inclined to engage and use online or 
more informal methods compared to the residents of backwater locations. There may be 
varieties of provincial backwaters too, reflecting distinct economic and demographic 
trajectories – such as the economic decline of former northern industrial towns with migrant 
communities. Citizens are poles apart in these two types of area in terms of their attitudes to 
the economic and social landscape. Both groups represent potentially powerful if 
substantially contradictory challenges to mainstream politics. Heightening the challenge is 
the fact that both groups have little trust in mainstream politics.  
 
Beyond England, the dynamics of this cosmopolitan versus backwater fission will vary 
depending on the economic location, institutional inheritance and cultural characteristics of 
different countries and regions. It will be tempered by the large number of citizens that are 
not at the polar edges of the attitudinal cosmopolitan/backwater political divide we identify. 
But it is far from clear that national political elites and actors will be able to rise to the 
challenge of this new economic and political context. The public disdain for their actions 
from both sides of the geo-economic divide limits their scope for action. The new fracturing 
of politics is setting an agenda and a dynamic of political participation that creates intractable 
dilemmas for national leaders. Local actors may be able more easily to offer both a political 
and a policy response that fits with their context but even they face a considerable challenge 
in meeting the diverse needs of cosmopolitan and backwater locations.    
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
Table S1: Mosaic Types in Cosmopolitan and Backwater Parliamentary Constituencies 
Mosaic ID Descriptor  
Cosmopolitan  
 
C10 Wealthy families in substantial houses with little community involvement  
C11 Creative professionals seeking involvement in local communities  
C12 Residents in smart city centre flats who make little use of public services  
E17 Comfortably off suburban families weakly tied to their local community  
F22 Busy executives in town houses in dormitory settlements  
G26 Well educated singles living in purpose built flats  
G27 City dwellers owning houses in older neighbourhoods  
G28 Singles and sharers occupying converted Victorian houses  
G29 Young professional families settling in better quality older terraces  
G30 Diverse communities of well-educated singles living in smart, small flats  
G31 Owners in smart purpose built flats in prestige locations, many newly built  
G32 Students and other transient singles in multi-let houses  
G34 Students involved in college and university communities  
H36 Young singles and sharers renting small purpose built flats  
Backwater 
 
B6 Self-employed trades people living in smaller communities  
B7 Empty nester owner occupiers making little use of public services  
B8 Mixed communities with many single people in the centres of small towns  
J45 Low income communities reliant on low skill industrial jobs  
K51 Often indebted families living in low rise estates  
L53 Residents in retirement, second home and tourist communities  
L54 Retired people of modest means commonly living in seaside bungalows  
M56 Older people living on social housing estates with limited budgets  
M58 Less mobile older people requiring a degree of care  
N61 Childless tenants in social housing flats with modest social needs  
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Table S2: list of constituencies sampled from the cosmopolitan/backwater profiles  
Rank Constituencies – Clactons Constituencies - Cambridges 
1 Clacton Cities of London and Westminster 
2 Norfolk North Chelsea and Fulham 
3 Isle of Wight Wimbledon 
4 Totnes Kensington 
5 Louth and Horncastle Richmond Park 
6 St Austell and Newquay Ealing Central and Acton 
7 Norfolk North West Twickenham 
8 Suffolk Coastal Hampstead and Kilburn 
9 New Forest West Finchley and Golders Green 
10 Norfolk South West Putney 
11 St Ives Battersea 
12 Bexhill and Battle Westminster North 
13 Dorset West Hammersmith 
14 Thanet North Enfield Southgate 
15 Tiverton and Honiton Bristol West 
16 Christchurch Kingston and Surbiton 
17 Cambridgeshire North East Brentford and Isleworth 
18 South Holland and The Deepings Tooting 
19 Camborne and Redruth Chipping Barnet 
20 Norfolk Mid Sutton and Cheam 
21 Cornwall South East Brighton Pavilion 
22 Broadland Manchester Withington 
23 Great Yarmouth Hornsey and Wood Green 
24 Bognor Regis and Littlehampton Holborn and St Pancras 
25 Cornwall North Beckenham 
26 Bridgwater and Somerset West Islington South and Finsbury 
27 Boston and Skegness Harrow West 
28 Devon East Cambridge 
29 Waveney Hove 
30 Yorkshire East Poplar and Limehouse 
31 Lewes Reading East 
32 Devon North Sheffield Central 
33 Devon West and Torridge Dulwich and West Norwood 
34 Dorset South Watford 
35 Norfolk South Islington North 
36 Newton Abbot Hendon 
37 Folkestone and Hythe St Albans 
38 Dover Bermondsey and Old Southwark 
39 Thanet South Brent North 
40 Havant Bath 
41 Harwich and Essex North Esher and Walton 
42 Suffolk South Lewisham West and Penge 
43 Eastbourne Streatham 
44 Yeovil Chingford and Woodford Green 
45 Brigg and Goole Bromley and Chislehurst 
46 Berwick-upon-Tweed Guildford 
47 Scarborough and Whitby Carshalton and Wallington 
48 Wells Ilford North 
49 Hastings and Rye Harrow East 
50 Sleaford and North Hykeham Vauxhall 
Note: Welsh and Scottish constituencies excluded from the sampling exercise.  
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